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MINOR DONOR CONSENT TO
TRANSPLANT SURGERY: A REVIEW OF
THE LAW
THoMAs H. MuRPHY, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty years, biomedical knowledge and
technological sophistication have reached the point where the
prolongation of human life by organ transplantation has be-
come almost commonplace.' Because society affords the high-
est priority to the values of human dignity and integrity, the
complexity of the ethical and legal issues that accompany the
utilization of this rapidly expanding body of knowledge must
of necessity be explored. Traditionally, the device which inter-
mediates between our present state of knowledge and our oper-
ative ethical systems has been the legal concept of consent. The
knowing and intelligent consent by a competent adult appears
prima facie to satisfy the requirement of respect for human
dignity. 2 However, at present, a minor, who is generally held
to be incapable of giving legally effective consent, 3 is frequently
* A.B. 1975, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1978, Boston College of Law; associate with
the law firm of Lynch, Brewer, Hoffman and Sands, Boston, Massachusetts; member
of the American and Massachusetts Bar Associations.
1. Dunphy, The Story of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 67,70-75 (1969).
Transplants of human organs and tissues are accomplished through one of two proce-
durs. Autografting entails the transfer of an organ or tissue front one part of the human
body to another. Homografting involves the transfer of an organ or tissue from one
human body - either a cadaver or a living donor - to the recipient body. Curran, A
Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplanation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891, 891
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Curran]. Isografting, a type of homograft, entails the
transfer of an organ or tissue from one identical twin to another.
2. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 CoLum. L. Rav. 48, 49 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. See Super-
intendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 2474, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424 (1977).
3. W. PRosS ER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToaRs § 18, at 102-03 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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the most acceptable donor in transplant procedures where, for
instance, a sibling needs a new organ or tissue.4 Consequently,
few areas of biomedical knowledge have produced more ethical
or legal debate than the issue of effectuating the consent of a
minor donor in transplant surgery. In those jurisdictions where
this issue of the effectiveness of a minor donor's consent has
arisen, it has generally been held that its resolution tail
some degree of judicial review.5 It is the basic premise of this
article that this judicial review must involve three considera-
tions: first, a determination of the precise function to be per-
formed by the court in its role of judicial oversight; second, an
articulation of the legal standards of review to be applied to the
consent issue; and third, a delineation of the means by which
that standard of review will actually be applied.6 Accordingly,
this article will explore these considerations in three sections.
First, a discussion of traditional tort law as it relates to minors
and their consent to medical treatment will outline the specific
difficulties which arise when effective consent is sought from a
minor transplant donor. 7 Next, recent case law will be critically
examined in order to discover the various functional roles
courts have assumed, and the standards of review they have
utilized, in addressing the efficacy of such consent.' Finally,
4. Baron, Botsford & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants from Minor Donors
in Massachusetts, 55 B.U.L. REv. 159, 159 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Baron]. This
situation results because the high degree of genetic similarity between siblings facili-
tates the success of any transplant procedure by minimizing the body's tendency to
reject foreign tissue. Id. See text accompanying notes 20-29 infra.
5. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972) (7 yr. old
identical twin - consent granted); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (27
yr. old incompetent - consent granted); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.
1973) (17 yr. old with mentality of 3 yr. old - consent denied); Masden v. Harrison,
Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. June 12, 1957); Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d
180 (1975) (39 yr. old mentally incompetent - consent denied). In general, any court
addressing the issue of a minor donor's consent to transplant surgery is confronted with
four alternatives: it could bar all transplant surgery involving minor donors on the
grounds that effective consent is impossible; it could redefine the common law princi-
ples governing parents' power to consent to such operations and treat that consent as
effective; it could lower the age of majority and treat some children's willingness to
serve as donors as effective consent; or it could devise new procedures and standards
to evaluate and authorize minor donor consent in individual transplant situations.
Baron, supra note 4, at 160.
6. For a similar approach to a problem of the application of legal standards to an
issue involving medical ethics, see Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 2470, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422-23 (1977).
7. See text accompanying notes 10-29 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 30-107 infra.
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the article will attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies of these
various roles and standards by outlining a suggested model for
the resolution of the issue of effectuating a minor donor's con-
sent in transplant surgery
I. MINORS, CONSENT, AND TRANSPLANT SURGERY: THE PROBLEM
DEFINED
Traditionally, the law has recognized the overwhelming in-
terest of individuals in preserving the inviolability of their bod-
ily integrity."° In general, this interest in being free from inten-
tional and unpermitted bodily invasions is of course protected
by the tort action commonly known as battery." Essentially,
the gist of an action for battery is the unconsenting nature of
the bodily contact rather than the hostile intent or motive on
the part of the tortfeasor.'2 As such, the consent of the person
damaged will ordinarily prevent liability for an intentional in-
terference entailed by a battery; a fundamental principle of the
common law being volenti non fit injuria - "to one who is
willing, no wrong is done."' 3 Thus, a surgical operation may
technically be a battery" if the surgeon who performs the oper-
ation does not have his patient's consent.1 5
To be effective, this consent must be made by one who has
the capacity to consent. 6 Consequently, consent by minors or
mental incompetents, who are said to be incapable of appre-
ciating the nature and consequences of a tortious invasion, is
generally held to be ineffective." The consent of a parent or
guardian, on the other hand, is considered to be effective and
thus prevents any potentially harmful invasion of the minor's
or incompetent's interests from later being held to be tortious.18
9. See text accompanying notes 108-125 infra.
10. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
11. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 9, at 34.
12. Id. at 36. To quote Mr. Justice Holmes, "[Tihe absence of lawful consent is
part of the definition of an assault. . . ." Ford v. Ford, 143 Mass. 577, 578, 10 N.E.
474, 475 (1887).
13. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 18, at 101; RESTATEMENr (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 892A(1),
Comment a at 22 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
14. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
15. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914); PROSSER, supra note 3, § 18, at 102-03.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a), Comment b at 22 (Tent. Draft
No. 18, 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59(1), at 111 (1934).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 892A(2)(a), Comment b at 22 (Tent. Draft
No. 18, 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59(1), at 111 (1934).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a), Comment b at 22 (Tent. Draft
1978]
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Therefore, in the case of any medical procedure on a minor, the
general rule is that parental assent is necessary to fulfill the
requirement of effective consent.'9
While parents have naturally assumed the primary role in
the care and protection of their minor children,0 modem legal
requirements have gone beyond the traditional moral duty of
good faith to require that parents also act in their children's
best interests. 2' In view of this requirement, a conflict of inter-
ests can clearly arise under the general parental consent rule
whenever parents are confronted with a situation where an
organ or tissue transplant from one child is needed to save the
life of another.2 For example, parents may have a desperately
ill child who faces death if no transplant surgery is performed
and although they wish to do whatever is necessary to save his
or her life, presumably they would not want to do so at the
expense of their healthy child, the prospective donor.2 Indeed,
it may be seriously questioned whether an operation to remove
any healthy organ or tissue can ever be in the interests of a
prospective donor, or whether the parents can be motivated
No. 18, 1972); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59(2), Comment a at 111-12 (1934).
19. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Reddington v. Clayman,
334 Mass. 244, 246-47, 134 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1956); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 9,
260 N.W. 99, 102 (1935); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 19, 139 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1956)
(concurring opinion); PROSSER, supra note 3, § 18, at 102-03. Two exceptions to the
general rule of parental consent have been recognized. The first exception allows medi-
cal personnel to "assume" or imply" consent whenever they render medical assistance
to a minor during a genuine emergency. Wells v. McGhee, 39 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. Ct.
App. 1949); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 449-50, 279 N.Y.S. 575, 576-78
(1935); PROSSER, supra note 3, § 18, at 102-03. The second exception allows the consent
of "mature" minors, or those of such an age or intelligence as to be capable of appre-
ciating the nature and consequences of their consent. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp., 205
Kan. 292, 300-01, 469 P.2d 330, 337-38 (1970) (17 years old); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio
St. 12, 14, 139 N.E.2d 25, 34 (1956) (concurring opinion) (18 years old); PROSSER, supra
note 3, § 18, at 102-03; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 892A, Comment b at 22
(Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972); RErSATMENT OF TORTS § 59, Comment a at 111 (1934). See
generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking Authority: A
Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285, 288-93 (1976).
20. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Sampson v. Taylor, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 900-01, 278 N.E.2d 918, 918-19
(1972), aff'g, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970).
22. See Baron, supra note 4, at 165-67.
23. Id. at 167. "[Tiransplant operations offer the greatest likelihood of prolonging
the life of the recipient without unduly threatening the well-being of the donor." Id.
at 163 (footnote omitted). "The most immediate cost to any transplant donor is the
risk attendent to general anesthesia." Id. at 163 n.20. Usually, the donation itself only
minimally inhibits the leading of a normal life. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp.
368, 374, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (1972); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Ky.
1969).
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solely by that child's best interests. 4
In view of this parental conflict of interests, the situation
presented by a proposed sibling transplant offers compelling
justification for restricting the parental power of choice and for
subjecting the consent decision to a review by some.delegated
community representative. 2 Naturally, the burden of this re-
view must of necessity fall upon the courts, as it is this office
which has traditionally been charged with the community's
parens patriae responsibility of protecting those persons who
labor-under legal disabilities.21 In effect, judicial review offers
the only potential means of ensuring that the substantive inter-
ests of a prospective minor donor will be considered before he
or she participates in a transplant operation.27 However, the
fulfillment of this obligation clearly depends upon the ability
of the courts to define and implement their role as arbitrators
of the parent's conflict of interests.2s Specifically, any court
addressing the issue of a minor donor's consent to transplant
surgery must first determine what its precise role is to be in
protecting the interests of the minor donor. In addition, it must
define the legal standards which will ultimately apply in adju-
dicating the issue of consent. 29 In short, the court must deter-
mine the judicial grounds upon which it will base its efforts to
eliminate the effects of the parental conflict of interests and to
24. Baron, supra note 4, at 167.
25. Id. See also Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 378, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (1972).
26. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 370, 289 A.2d 386,387 (1972); Superintend-
ent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 2483, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427
(1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44-45, 355 A.2d 647, 666 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). It is well established "that the state has a wide range of power for limiting
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944). Most frequently, the state has interfered in
the parent-child relationship where the parent has refused to permit the child access
to medically therapeutic procedures. E.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475-78, 181
A.2d 751, 758-59 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (blood transfusion). In the
context of nontherapeutic procedures, Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir
1941), held that parental consent was necessary for surgery on a minor. The facts,
however, in that case did not require a decision of whether the parents' consent was
in itself sufficient for the skin transplant from a minor. See Baron, supra note 4, at
175. Therefore, the issues of the sufficiency of parental consent and the grounds for
judicial review of a minor donor's consent to transplant surgery remained unsettled
after Bonner.
27. Baron, supra note 4, at 168.
28. See id.
29. Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461,
2470, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422-23 (1977) (involving right to refuse life-prolonging therapy);
Baron, supra note 4, at 168-69.
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ensure that the interests of the minor donor are strictly ob-
served. It has been this predicament which recent courts have
had to confront.
I". RECENT CASE LAW
A. "Substituted Judgment" and "Best Interests"
The first reported appellate decision to address the issue of
the effectiveness of an incompetent donor's consent to trans-
plant surgery, and to speak of the judiciary's role in its resolu-
tion, was Strunk v. Strunk.30 Strunk presented a situation
wherein a 27 year old mentally incompetent ward of the state
was found to be the most medically acceptable kidney donor
for his 28 year old brother.3 1 Prompted by hospital concern over
the issue of the effectiveness of the incompetent's consent, 32 the
brothers' mother, acting as committee for her retarded son,3
successfully petitioned a county court for authority to proceed
with the transplant operation.34 On appeal, the Franklin
County Circuit Court, a court of equity, adopted the findings
of the county court and affirmed the authorization for the
transplant surgery.35 In reviewing the decisions of the lower
courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals framed the issue in
terms of the equity court's power to permit the donation of a
kidney by an incompetent donor upon petition of a guardian .3
Drawing upon the equitable doctrine of "substituted judg-
ment, 37 the court of appeals held that the chancery court, as
30. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
31. Id. at 145.46.
32. Savage, Organ Transplantation With an Incompetent Donor: Kentucky Re-
solves the Dilemma of Strunk v. Strunk, 58 Ky. L.J. 129, 149 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Savage].
33. Under the Kentucky law, the "committee" is the guardian of an incompetent.
See Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 387.210-.220 (1972).
34. 445 S.W.2d at 146.
35. Id. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
36. 445 S.W.2d at 145.
37. As first enunciated in England, the doctrine of "substituted judgment" empow-
ers a court of equity to invade the estate of an incompetent, for the purpose of providing
a gift to a person, to whom the incompetent owes no duty of support, on the grounds
that the incompetent would choose to do so if he were still competent. Ex parte
Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816). Subsequently, "substituted judgment"
was adopted and utilized in a number of American jurisdictions. E.g., In re Brice's
Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 186-87, 8 N.W.2d 576, 578-79 (1943); Strange v. Powers,
358 Mass. 126, 130-33, 260 N.E.2d 704, 708-10 (1970); In re Buckley's Estate, 330 Mich.
102, 105-08, 47 N.W.2d 33, 36-37 (1951). Application of the doctrine requires a court
to "don the mental mantle of the incompetent," In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545,
241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (1962), and "to substitute itself as nearly as may be for the
[Vol. 62:149
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a court of equity, did possess the inherent power to authorize
a transplant operation involving an incompetent donor." Spe-
cifically, the court noted that the statutory power given a com-
mittee would not of itself be sufficient to encompass consent
for surgery unless the life of the ward was in the balance. Nor
did the court believe the powers delegated to the county court
were of sufficient reach to allow the contemplated procedure.
However, because the lower courts' findings were supported by
substantial evidence, the authorization of the transplant sur-
gery was affirmed."
In its decision, the court of appeals initially relied upon the
doctrine of "substituted judgment" and the inherent power of
courts of equity to establish the authority of the Kentucky
courts to adjudicate the legal issues involved in the controversy
presented by Tommy Strunk's need for a kidney transplant."
This reliance was unnecessary however, as statutory authority
for such a decision already existed under the provisions of Ken-
tucky's declaratory judgment statute." Although it is unclear
from the Strunk decision whether Mrs. Strunk's petition to the
county court was formally made under the declaratory judg-
ment statute, it is clear that the petition sought a declaration
of legal rights in the controversy between the Strunk family
and the hospital officials, which was in the nature of a declara-
tory judgment under the terms of the statute!2 In essence, a
controversy appeared to exist concerning the issue of Jerry's
consent for the donation of his kidney, and Mrs. Strunk at-
tempted to resolve that controversy by seeking authority from
the court to give consent for the operation. 3 Thus, considering
incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considerations as would have
moved" the incompetent. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594,
599 (1945). See also In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 853, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236
(1940).
38. 445 S.W.2d at 149.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 147-48.
41. Ky. REv. STAT. § 418.040 (1977):
In any action in a court of record of this Commonwealth having general
jurisdiction wherein it is made to appear that an actual controversy exists, the
plaintiff may ask for a declaration of rights, either alone or with other relief; and
the court may make a binding declaration of rights, whether or not consequen-
tial relief is or could be asked.
This declaratory judgment statute is to be liberally construed and administered. Con-
tinental Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 277 Ky. 361, 363, 126 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1939).
42. See 445 S.W.2d at 146.
43. Such an approach has been taken under the Massachusetts declaratory judg-
19781
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the clear authority of the declaratory judgment statute, the
court of appeals' initial reliance upon the doctrine of
"substituted judgment" and the inherent common-law powers
of equity courts was largely unnecessary.
Moreover, even if some reference to the principles of
"substituted judgment" was, by analogy, appropriate to clarify
the court's basis of judicial authority, the analysis that the
court of appeals ultimately pursued in Strunk was not itself an
application of "substituted judgment." In the case of an indi-
vidual suffering from congenital mental retardation, such as
Jerry Strunk, or of a minor, there is no period of prior compe-
tency upon which to evaluate his values, desires or preferences
in terms of the "judgment" to be substituted." Thus, any
meaningful effort to ensure respect for the dignity and integrity
of the incompetent individual or minor is necessarily under-
taken without satisfactory guidelines or safeguards.4 5 Conse-
quently, while a traditional application of "substituted judg-
ment" involves the determination of the subjective question of
what an incompetent individual would desire or prefer if he
were still competent," an application of the doctrine to a con-
genitally retarded individual, such as Jerry Strunk, or to a
minor, is transformed into a determination of the objective
question of what, in fact, a court deems best for the individual
involved." Accordingly, in the case of Jerry Strunk, because a
subjective evaluation was impossible due to his severe and life-
long retardation, the court of appeals was forced to focus upon
the testimony of third parties as to the nature of Jerry's rela-
tionship with his brother" and to make an objective evaluation
of what was best for Jerry under the circumstances." Therefore,
the court of appeals did not in fact apply the substantive analy-
ment statute, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, § 1 (West 1974), in Nathan v. Farinelli,
Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass. July 3, 1974); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. June
12, 1957).
44. Robertson, supra note 2, at 66-67; Baron, supra note 4, at 170 n.54.
45. See In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 853, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-37 (1940);
Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
46. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 2489-
90, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d
288, 289 (1962); In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 853, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-37
(1940). See note 37 supra.
47. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2461, 2489-
90, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977); Baron, supra note 4, at 170 n.54.
48. 445 S.W.2d at 146-47.
49. Id. at 149.
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sis of "substituted judgment." Indeed, the reference to
"substituted judgment" is in essence, little more than the
Strunk court's convenient, but misplaced, semantic tag for its
unfamiliar judicial role in effectuating the incompetent's con-
sent. It may be more logical, as a conceptual matter, to view
the decision in terms of the court's review of the committee's
consent decision with the objective determination of Jerry
Strunk's best interests forming the standard of review for the
court's approval and authorization of the transplant.ra Simply
stated, the court did consider evidence of the adverse psychol-
ogical effect Tommy Strunk's death would have on his retarded
brother, Jerry, and concluded that the donation of a kidney for
the purpose of saving his brother's life would benefit Jerry."
Thus, the court in effect found that the transplant surgery
would be in the donor's best interests and, on this basis, ap-
proved the operation.2
While the Kentucky court may have poorly focused upon its
proper judicial function in determining this issue, its decision
nontheless was in accordance with the prevailing concepts of
minor donor consent. In short, courts ordinarily authorize the
medical treatment of minors or incompetents only if it can be
shown that the procedure is likely to result in a net benefit to
the individual.13 In the Strunk case, evidence of the psychologi-
cal benefit provided just such proof.
Although a "best interests" standard may be derived, in
part, from a traditional application of the "substituted judg-
ment" doctrine,5 the desirability of severing the two concepts
of "substituted judgment" and "best interests," when con-
fronting the issue of a minor donor's consent to transplant sur-
gery, is demonstrated by two appellate decisions which fol-
lowed Strunk. In Lausier v. Pescinski,55 the Wisconsin Supreme
50. See text accompanying notes 93-100 infra.
51. 445 S.W.2d at 146-47.
52. Id. at 149.
53. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000,
1007-08 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (blood transfusion to an
adult); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 623-24, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (blood
transfusion to an infant); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576,
583-85, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (1971) (blood transfusion to an adult); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 475-78, 181 A.2d 751, 758-59 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (blood
transfusion to an infant); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 88-89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130-
31 (1962) (blood transfusion to an infant); Baron, supra note 4, at 170.
54. See note 37 supra.
55. 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
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Court expressly held that it would not adopt the doctrine of
"substituted judgment" in deciding the consent issue involved
in a proposed kidney transplant from a thirty-nine year old
mental incompetent to his thirty-eight year old sister.56 Al-
though the court ultimately refused to authorize the operation,
it implied that had some donor benefit been established its
decision would have been different. 57 Thus, the court unknow-
ingly applied a best interests test. Similarly, in In re
Richardson,-" the court of appeals of Louisiana carefully distin-
guished the Strunk court's use of the "substituted judgment"
analysis as a source of judicial authority to authorize an incom-
petent's consent. In this case the consent issue involved a pro-
posed kidney transplant from a seventeen year old mental in-
competent to a thirty-two year old sister." The court here ex-
pressly held that the operation would not be in the best inter-
ests of the incompetent minor donor. 0 Thus, the courts of both
Wisconsin and Louisiana rejected the "substituted judgment"
test as the basis of the judicial function involved in the review
of an incompetent or minor donor's consent to transplant sur-
gery, while implicitly or explicitly recognized the propriety,
and probable necessity, of some application of the "best inter-
ests" analysis.
In the specific context of effectuating a consent decision,
the development of the "best interests" doctrine is best illus-
trated by a series of unreported declaratory judgment decrees
entered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,6 ' in
which the "best interests" standard of review was first applied
to the minor donor transplant situation. 2 The leading case in
56. Id. at 7-8, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
57. Id. at 8-9, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
58. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
59. Id. at 187.
60. Id.
61. The Massachusetts courts are authorized to make declaratory judgments under
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, § 1 (West 1974). When appropriate, actions for
declaratory relief may be heard by a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court sitting in single session. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 8 (West Supp. 1979).
62. Nathan v. Meekins, Eq. No. 74-109 (Mass. June 14, 1974) (bone marrow);
Nicosia v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., Eq. No. 73-8 (Mass. Feb. 26, 1973) (kidney);
Kennedy v. Nathan, Eq. No. 72-136 (Mass. Oct. 3, 1972) (bone marrow); Holden v.
Hampers, Eq. No. 71-40 (Mass. Aug. 2, 1971) (kidney); Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No.
68674 (Mass. Nov. 20, 1957) (kidney); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68666 (Mass. Aug.
30, 1957) (kidney); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. June 12, 1957) (kidney).
See Baron, supra note 4, at 161 n.15. As a general matter, these Massachusetts deci-
sions are conceptually similar to Strunk in their reasoning.
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this series of decisions is Masden v. Harrison.3 Masden pre-
sented a situation wherein one twin, who was suffering from a
chronic kidney ailment, was in need of a kidney transplant
from his nineteen year old brother. 4 Explicitly relying upon a
"best interests" standard of review, the court held that the
operation was necessary for the continued well-being of both
the donee and the donor and that the proposed surgery could
go forward."
In its findings, the supreme judicial court established that
both the parents and the donor, Leonard, had rendered in-
formed and voluntary consents to the operation.6 Relating the
case to an emergency situation where surgery could be per-
formed upon a minor - even without the consent of the minor
or his parents - the court turned to the difficult question of
finding a "benefit" to be enjoyed by a minor who was about to
lose one of his vital organs. 7 On this question, the court admit-
ted testimony from a psychiatrist who had interviewed the
twins and who had found that the death of the recipient, Leon,
would inflict a "grave emotional impact" upon the donor.
Explicitly relying upon this testimony, the court held that the
"operation is necessary for the continued good health and fu-
ture well-being of Leonard and that in performing the opera-
tion the defendants are conferring a benefit upon Leonard as
well as Leon."69 Accordingly, the supreme judicial court ap-
proved the donor's consent to the transplant and allowed the
surgeons to proceed without risking civil or criminal liability.70
Undeniably, the use of a "best interests" standard with its
requisite finding of some benefit to the donor conceptually
guarantees to a high degree meaningful respect and protection
of the dignity and integrity of the individual minor donor."
Consequently, several jurisdictions have adopted the "best in-
terests" standard as announced in Masden.72 Indeed, it was
63. Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. June 12, 1957).
64. Curran, supra note 1, at 892-93.
65. Eq. No. 68651, at 4; see Baron, supra note 4, at 161 n.14.
66. Eq. No. 68651, at 3; see Baron, supra note 4, at 161 n.14.
67. Eq. No. 68651, at 4. See note 19 supra.
68. Eq. No. 68651, at 2.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Curran, supra note 1, at 893.
71. See Baron, supra note 4, at 168; Robertson, supra note 2, at 64.
72. E.g., Howard v. Fulton-Dekalb Memorial Hosp. Auth., Civil No. B-90430
(Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga., Nov. 29, 1973); Children's Memorial Hosp. v. Lewis,
No. 73CH6936 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Nov. 21, 1973).
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precisely the type of psychiatric evidence produced in Masden
which the Kentucky court relied upon to support its finding
that it was in the best interest of Jerry Strunk to donate a
kidney to his brother.73
The "best interests" standard, however, has been subjected
to substantial criticism for its one glaring flaw: i.e., that of the
often speculative and generally questionable nature of the psy-
chological evidence used to establish donor benefit. 4 Any ac-
ceptable evaluation of the preferences and emotional state of
a minor or an incompetent has been argued to be extremely
difficult to establish due to the limited mental capacity of the
individual being evaluated.75 Simply, prediction of future emo-
tional effect or a definite determination of an individual's ca-
pacity to withstand emotional trauma is often impossible, es-
pecially in reference to minors or severely retarded individuals.
Furthermore, even when a facially acceptable evaluation can
be made, its results can often be attacked as contrived76 or
merely restatements of "common sense" in professional jar-
gon.77 In short, medical witnesses often consciously provide
courts with the necessary words to satisfy a finding of psychol-
ogical benefit and often those words amount to nothing more
than a psychiatrist's common sense opinion of the family ties
he has observed.78 Therefore, some courts have been forced to
conclude that any psychiatric evaluation presented as evidence
of donor benefit must be viewed at best as highly speculative
and at worst as unreliable.
Because of the inherent limitation of both the "substituted
judgment" review and the "best interests" analysis, courts
have been spurred to create still another standard of review,
that of the "review of the parental decision." Like its predeces-
73. 445 S.W.2d at 146-47.
74. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 375, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 150-51 (Ky. 1969) (dissenting opinion); Note, 58
CALIw. L. Rav. 754, 761-63 (1970); Note, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1460, 1464-69 (1970).
75. Stetter, Kidney Donation From Minors and Incompetents, 35 LA. L. REv. 551,
556 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stetter]; Note, 58 CALiF. L. REv. 754, 762 (1970); Note,
16 WAYNE L. REV. 1460, 1466-67 (1970). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
76. Baron, supra note 4, at 171.
77. Woodside, Organ Transplantation: The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's
Responsibility, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 66, 78 (1970).
78. Baron, supra note 4, at 171. In essence, this "common sense" amounts to the
conclusion that all people, including children and retarded individuals, need love and
caring and suffer a degree of loss when someone close to them dies. Note, 58 CAIF. L.
REv. 754, 761 (1970).
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sors, however, it too cannot fully deal with the problems posed
by minor donor consent.
B. "Review of the Parental Decision"
The two leading decisions utilizing the reasoning of the
"review of the parental decision," are the cases of Hart v.
Brown79 and Nathan v. Farinelli.s° In Hart, the parents of two
seven year old identical twins sought judicial authorization for
a kidney transplant when it was discovered that one twin,
Katheleen, was suffering from a kidney disease.8' The prospec-
tive donor was to be Katheleen's sister, Margaret. The Con-
necticut court, after reviewing Strunk's use of "substituted
judgment" and stating that it had authority to consider the
controversy,8" concluded that it was confronted with a combi-
nation of the Strunk and Masden cases in that Masden in-
volved minor identical twins while Strunk involved an incom-
petent adult with the mental capacity of an infant.s The court
stressed that its objective was to render an equitable result
consistent with the decisions of the Kentucky and Massachu-
setts courts. 4 Enunciating the means by which this objective
would be accomplished, the court stated that the natural par-
ents of a minor donor had the right to give their consent to a
kidney transplant procedure "when their motivation and rea-
soning . . .[were] favorably reviewed by a community repre-
sentation which includes a court of equity." ' Therefore, weigh-
ing the particular facts of the situation under review, including
an express finding of donor benefit, the court approved the
kidney transplant operation. 86
In Farinelli, the parents of two young children sought judi-
cial authorization of a bone marrow transplant from their
healthy six year old daughter to their ten year old son. The son
was suffering from aplastic anemia.17 Unlike the Connecticut
79. 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972).
80. Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass. July 3, 1974).
81. 29 Conn. Supp. at 369, 289 A.2d at 387.
82. Id. at 370-71, 289 A.2d at 387-88. This discussion appears almost superfluous
considering the availability of the Connecticut declaratory judgment statute, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29 (West 1960), and the court's ultimate disposition of the case.
29 Conn. Supp. at 378, 289 A.2d at 391.
83. 29 Conn. Supp. at 377, 289 A.2d at 390.
84. Id. at 378, 289 A.2d at 391.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Eq. No..74-87, at 1.
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court, however, the Massachusetts court was unable to make
any finding of donor benefit due to its assessment that the
psychological evidence presented to the court was unduly spec-
ulative." Accordingly, the court reasoned that if authorization
of the transplant was to be given at all, it would have to be
based on some ground other than donor benefit." Obviously
pursuing an objective identical to that of the Hart court, the
Farinelli court then concluded that a finding of donor benefit
was not essential, and that the absence of such a finding was
not fatal to allowance of the transplant surgery." Thus, the
court, rejecting any reliance upon the doctrine of "substituted
judgment" and also the necessity of donor benefit, recognized
the parents' "primary right and responsibility for deciding the
delicate question" presented by the consent decision, and the
court's concomitant duty to review that decision.' Weighing
the particular facts of the situation under review, which as
noted previously did not include any finding of donor benefit,
the court approved the bone marrow transplant.2
Considering this reasoning, the most pertinent aspect of the
Hart and Farinelli decisions is their identification of the precise
function to be performed by the courts in their review of au-
thorizations given by parents for minor donors. In the plain
language of both decisions, the function of the courts was to
review the parents' decision giving consent to their minor
child's donation of an organ or tissue." Simply put, the Hart
and Farinelli decisions recognize the parents' essential right to
consent to medical treatment for their children and the court's
secondary role of reviewing the propriety of that decision as a
means of protecting the minor donor from the parental conflict
of interests. 4 In so doing, the courts exercised their authority
solely within the context of the traditional tort concept of con-
sent as well as in deference to the parents' primary role in the
medical care of their minor children. 5 As such, the courts
adopted a straightforward and familiar direction in exercising
88. Id. at 2, 4.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 4; 29 Conn. Supp. at 377-78, 289 A.2d at 391.
94. Eq. No. 74-87, at 4; 29 Conn. Supp. at 378, 289 A.2d at 391. See text accorpa-
nying notes 20-29 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
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their role as arbitrators of any parental conflict of interest and
as protectors of the interests of the minor donor. Therefore,
rather than manipulating the "substituted judgment" doctrine
of property law," the Hart and Farinelli courts were able to
define a clear, manageable and well-based functional role for
their consideration of the issue of parental consent to minor
donors undergoing transplant surgery.
The implementation of this functional role, however, pres-
ents some definite difficulties. In both the Hart and Farinelli
decisions, the courts adopted a standard of review which en-
tailed a balancing of the values of the particular situation to
determine whether the parental consent was untainted by a
conflict of interests. 7 In the Hart case the interest of the minor
donor was only one of several factors to be considered by the
court. More importantly, each factor was apparently given
equal weight." Thus, the balancing test tended to recreate the
no-win situation presented to parents of sacrificing the interest
of one child to advance the interests of another." Furthermore,
the junior position in which the interests of the minor donor
were placed under the Hart balancing test, in contrast to its
senior position under the "best interests" standard of review, 01'
threatened to undermine the very justification for judicial re-
view of the parents' consent - the maximum protection of the
minor donor's interests. 10 Indeed, this threat saw fruition in
Farinelli where the court expressly determined that it could not
find sufficient evidence to substantiate a finding of donor bene-
fit.0 2 Thus, considering the fundamental role that the concept
of benefit has played in court authorization of medical treat-
ment of minors, 03 the less than primary consideration of the
minor donor's best interests, which is necessarily found in any
96. Eq. No. 74-87, at 4. See note 37 supra.
97. Eq. No. 74-87, at 5; 29 Conn. Supp. at 377-78, 289 A.2d at 391.
98. 29 Conn. Supp. at 377-78, 289 A.2d at 391. Among the factors considered were
the donee's need for the transplant, the risks to the donee and the donor, the parents'
consent and the benefits to the donor.
99. See Baron, supra note 4, at 172. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 51-53, 68-75 supra.
101. See notes 23, 26 supra; text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
102. Eq. No. 74-87, at 2.
103. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 Ill. 618, 623-24, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475-78, 181 A.2d 751, 758-59, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962);
In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 88-89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130-31 (1962). See note 26 supra;
text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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balancing standard, potentially defeats the purpose of judicial
review. '"I
Because of this analysis of the rationale underlying the
"review of parental decision" cases, the state of the law on the
minor donor consent issue becomes somewhat unclear and un-
certain. On the one hand, the Hart and Farinelli courts succeed
in plainly describing the precise judicial function to be per-
formed in reviewing substituted consent for minors. Indeed, the
simplicity and familiarity of this function readily commends
itself to implementation by the judiciary.10 5 However, the Hart
and Farinelli decisions were initally dictated, to a large extent,
by the weaknesses which inhered in the application of the "best
interests" standard. On the other hand, these decisions also
succeeded in debasing the fundamental and well-reasoned
underpinnings of the "best interests" test.' 6 As such, the devel-
opment of the judicial role in the resolution of a family's trans-
plant consent dilemma '07 remains essentially an incomplete
and unperfected process. As a suggested solution, the combina-
tion of the "best interest" test with the "review of the parental
decision" seems appropriate, for each offers advantages the
other lacks; review of the parental decision could define the
functional role while the "best interest" test could provide the
standard of review. Thus, the reconciliation of the "best inter-
ests of the donor" test with the "review of parental decision"
should be the overriding goal on any court confronted with the
issue of parental consent to transplant surgery involving minor
donors.
HI. "BEST INTERESTS" AND "REVIEW OF PARENTAL DECISION"
RECONCILED
In any attempted reconciliation of the "best interests" stan-
dard with the functional role of the "review of parental deci-
sion," the basic issue is how the "best interests" standard can
be applied within the process of reviewing the parental consent.
By way of resolution of this issue, it is important to note that
whenever a "best interests" analysis has been undertaken,
whether as an explicit standard of review or as a factor in a
balancing process, its application has been accompanied by
104. See Baron, supra note 4, at 172-74.
105. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 51-53, 66-73 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
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specific findings concerning other relevant facts in the trans-
plant controversy.' For example, most courts have noted that
the donor's parents or guardian have consented to the trans-
plant surgery. 09 Courts also have considered whether the donor
had given consent to the surgery, at least to the extent possible
within his or her limited mental capabilities. 10 Related to this
consideration, most courts have also noted the age and mental
development of a minor donor or the mental age and "I.Q." of
an incompetent donor."' Similarly, most courts have discussed
whether a transplant is medically essential to the preservation
of the donee's health and life"' and whether the minor or in-
competent is the most acceptable donor."3 Related to this dis-
cussion, courts have also considered the probable success of the
transplant and the probability of long-term benefit to the
donee."' In sum, what emerges from these discussions and con-
siderations is a list of facts which influence the courts' disposi-
tion of the issue of the effectiveness of a minor donor's consent
to transplant surgery by that minor donor.
In view of this list, it appears reasonable that certain of
these facts should constitute prerequisite findings to any appli-
cation of the "best interests" standard within the context of the
108. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.
1973); Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87 (Mass. July 3, 1974); Masden v. Harrison,
Eq. No. 68651 (Mass. June 12, 1957); Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d
180 (1975).
109. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 369, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (1972); Strunk v.
Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La.
Ct. App. 1973); Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87, at 1 (Mass. July 3, 1974); Masden
v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651, at 3 (Mass. June 12, 1957).
110. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 375, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (1972); Masden v.
Harrison, Eq. No. 68651, at 3 (Mass. June 12, 1957); Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d
4, 7, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (1975). See Savage, supra note 32, at 147.
111. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 368, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185,
186 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87, at 1 (Mass. July 3, 1974);
Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 6, 226 N.W.2d 180, 180 (1975).
112. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 372-73, 289 A.2d 386, 387-88 (1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146-47 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185,
186-87 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87, at 1 (Mass. July 3,
1974); Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 6, 226 N.W.2d 180, 180 (1975).
113. Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 372-73, 289 A.2d 386, 386, 388-89 (1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185,
186-87 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 6, 226 N.W.2d 180, 180-
81 (1975).
114. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La. Ct. App. 1973). See Hart v. Brown,
29 Conn. Supp. 368, 373, 289 A.2d 386, 388 (1972).
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functional rule presented by the "review of parental decision."
For instance, to conform with the traditional theories of con-
sent found in tort law, and to have in fact parental consent
upon which a court can act, the parents or guardian of the
minor donor should obviously consent to the transplant proce-
dure. In addition, medical testimony should accompany that
consent, objectively demonstrating that an organ or tissue
transplant is essential for the preservation of the donee's life,
and that, as a medical fact, the proposed minor is the most
acceptable donor. Furthermore, it should be established that
the proposed transplant has a medically reasonable probability
of relieving the recipient's condition and that no other disease
or ailment, independent of the condition necessitating the
transplant, will unreasonably jeopardize the success of the
transplant operation."5 Finally, there should be a showing that
the operation has a reasonable chance of bettering the donee's
condition rather than merely prolonging it or stabilizing it at a
precarious level. Simply, these prerequisites would serve to de-
fine the nature of the parental decision the court would have
to review and to establish the threshold issue of evaluating the
minor donor's best interests."6
Once these initial findings are made, the court should then
focus upon the age and mental maturity of the minor donor.
To whatever extent the donor's mental capacity permits, the
court should make every effort to determine the willingness of
the donor to participate in the surgery. Under this determina-
tion, if the minor donor is of sufficient age and mental develop-
ment that the court finds that he or she is fully capable of
understanding the ramifications of the transplant situation
and of giving an informed consent, the court should end its
review at this point and approve the surgery. Although resem-
bling the "mature minor" consent rule, 17 this resolution of the
consent issue presents an aggregation of factual findings such
115. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La. Ct. App. 1973). In Richardson, the
donee's multiple and severe medical disorders, which endangered the success of any
surgery, weighed heavily in the court's refusal to authorize the kidney transplant.
116. While the absence of a positive finding concerning medical necessity and
propriety will necessarily terminate the court's review and prohibit the proposed trans-
plant surgery, the absence of a positive finding concerning parental or donor consent
in some rare instances may not be fatal to further judicial inquiry and subsequent
authorization of the transplant procedures. See notes 119, 120 infra.
117. See note 19 supra. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court utilized the
"mature minor" rule to review and approve transplant surgery in Rappeport v. Stott,
Civil No. J74-57 (Mass. Aug. 28, 1974). See Baron, supra note 4, at 176-78.
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as parental consent, medical necessity and propriety, as well
as the mature, informed consent of the donor. In this fashion,
the particular minor donor can be afforded both protection
beyond his or her individual "mature" decision and respect, as
a "near-adult," for choices made concerning his or her personal
dignity and integrity. Thus, in a situation involving a
"mature" minor donor, these factual findings would amount to
clear and convincing evidence of what in fact the minor donor's
best interests were."18 Therefore, the aggregation of these fac-
tual findings within a "mature minor" context could be said to
constitute a benefit for the donor per se, using a "best inter-
ests" standard within the functional role provided by the
"review of parental decision.""' 9
Under the aforementioned prerequisite findings, the actual
and active application of the "best interests" standard of re-
view would thus be limited to situations wherein the particular
minor's understanding of the transplant operation would be
limited and evaluated as less than the informed consent of a
"mature minor."''12  In such situations, the court's inquiry
would proceed to an application of the "best interests" stan-
dard similar to that of the Strunk and Masachusetts' decisions,
as a means of supplementing the factual findings provided for
by the suggested "review of the consent" test.' 2' While the evi-
dence needed to satisfy the "best interests" standard would
still include testimony on the psychological benefits to the
donor, 21 other facts relevant to the "best interests" of the donor
118. See Baron, supra note 4, at 178-81.
119. Admittedly, this "mature minor" resolution will be available in only a minor-
ity of sibling transplant cases. This resolution could also be utilized to authorize
transplant procedures in the rare situation where a "mature" minor donor expresses
an informed consent to participate in a transplant procedure, but the parents refuse
to do the same.
120. If the donor is demonstrably unwilling to participate in the surgery or if for
some reason, such as the extreme infancy of the minor or the severe retardation of an
incompetent individual, a finding of willingness to participate is simply impossible to
make, then presumably the court would have to deny approval of the transplant
surgery unless it was presented with overwhelming evidence of donor benefit. See
Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 5-8, 226 N.W.2d 180, 180-82 (1975); Baron, supra
note 4, at 180-81.
121. See Baron, supra note 4, at 180. See text accompanying notes 51-53, 66-73
supra.
122. "Studies of adult donors indicate that the main benefits [of an organ or tissue
donation] are an increase in self-esteem, an avoidance of the guilt feelings that might
result if the donor did not participate, and the satisfaction which follows from the
family's gratitude." Baron, supra note 4, at 164 n.21. Therefore, there is a substantial
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would also have to be considered in order to minimize the
inherent limitations of the psychological evidence. 23 Primary
among these facts would be the nature of the relationship be-
tween the proposed donor and the sibling donee. Testimony by
relatives, neighbors, teachers and clergy could clearly establish
the degree of attachment and identification between the sib-
lings and provide a demonstrable factual basis for any psychol-
ogical conclusions of "benefit" or "emotional trauma" which
often appear to be contrived or speculative.' 24 Indeed, evidence
of prior manifestations of a loving and caring relationship could
be the most concrete means of establishing that a minor donor
would enjoy a "benefit" and that his donation would truly be
in his best interests.2 5 In this manner, the court's determina-
tion of the best interests of the donor could rest upon objective
facts of a nature more susceptible to judicial interpretation,
and thereby could assume a more conclusive role in the court's
review of the parental decision.
Following this suggested line of reasoning, the combination
of the "best interests" test with the "review of parental deci-
sion" presents to courts viable alternatives to the confused
paths of past decisions. On the one hand, the adoption of the
prerequisite factual findings, including the "mature minor"
aspect, places the court clearly in the conceptual position of
reviewing the parental consent decision. In addition, the fac-
tual findings also restrict the potential re-occurrence of any
difficulties with the "best interests" standard by allowing the
court to dispose of some cases without an active application of
the standard. In such cases, the court could at once act summa-
rily and also in a manner consistent with the protection of
personal dignity and integrity. On the other hand, when the
court does resort to an active application of the "best interests"
standard, it will do so through the evaluation of objective evi-
dence of a clear and definite nature and as the conclusive find-
ing in its review of the consent. In such cases, the paramount
basis for concluding that a donation by a minor may well produce psychological bene-
fits, either at the time of the act or later in life. Id. at 178.
123. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
124. See Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 375, 289 A.2d 386, 389-90 (1972);
Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No. 74-87, at 2-4 (Mass. July 3, 1974).
125. See Stetter, supra note 75, at 561. Plainly, the most persuasive evidence
presented at the Strunk hearing was the moving testimony of Mrs. Strunk describing
the close relationship between her sons. Savage, supra note 32, at 144.
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interests of the minor donor's personal integrity and dignity are
assured of complete protection from the effects of any parental
conflict of interests. By this method, the "best interests" stan-
dard of review may be reconciled with the functional role of the
"review of parental decision" for resolving the issue of the effec-
tiveness of a minor donor's consent to transplant surgery.
IV. CONCLUSION
In addressing the issue of the effectiveness of a minor
donor's consent to transplant surgery, the judicial role in re-
viewing any consent decision is, of course, necessitated by the
parental conflict of interests. This conflict arises whenever an
organ or tissue transplant is proposed and a minor donor is
involved. In such cases the role of the court is to ensure the
protection of the personal dignity and integrity of the minor
donor. Specifically, courts assuming this role must focus upon
three considerations. First, there must be an exact formulation
of the function to be performed in the exercise of judicial rea-
soning and authority. In this context, the traditional concep-
tual foundation of the tort law, which involves reviewing the
parental consent, has proven to be the most well considered.
Second, there is the standard of review which must be applied
to the consent issue. In this context, while some courts in their
adoption of a "review of parental decision" have expressed
their reluctance to accept findings of "benefit" to a minor who
is about to lose an organ, the fundamental and well-reasoned
standard of review must be one which addresses itself to the
best interests of the minor donor. Last, the confrontation of
these two considerations, and the inconsistencies that they en-
tail, necessarily result in a need to delineate the means of
applying the "best interests" standard within the functional
role of the "review of parental decision." Weighing these con-
siderations, future courts should use prerequisite factual find-
ings and objective evidence of donor benefit to apply the "best
interests" standard within the "review of parental decision."
By the means of this suggested "review of the consent," the
"best interests of the donor" may be reconciled with the
"review of parental decision" in resolving the issue of the effec-
tiveness of a minor donor's consent to transplant surgery.
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